A Child’s Legal Representative (“CLR”) is appointed by a court for one purpose: to protect the best interests of the children. The concerns below are my own firsthand account of Ms. Saltzman’s conduct while she served as CLR in a Colorado domestic‑relations matter — based on communications I received and matters I personally witnessed. I have also raised these concerns in a written Request for Investigation submitted to the Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC). For each concern, I identify the specific rule she had a duty to follow, and the statute and court decisions behind it — explained in plain terms below. Every rule and statute is linked to its official text; hover (or tap) any dotted‑underlined citation for a plain‑language explanation.
Because a Child’s Legal Representative is appointed by the court, she generally cannot be sued for money over how she performed the role. That protection is called quasi‑judicial immunity. In plain terms: it takes away the usual courtroom remedy — a lawsuit.
But immunity from being sued is not permission to break the rules. A CLR still has a statutory and professional duty to follow the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct (C.R.S. § 14‑10‑116; Chief Justice Directive 04‑06, § V.B). Immunity does not erase that duty, and it does not license reckless or dishonest conduct — it simply means the person harmed cannot collect damages in court. That is precisely why the two remaining checks are attorney discipline and public awareness.
Does immunity let a court‑appointed attorney act this recklessly? It should not — and this is one of many stories. I am not isolated.
The governing orders provided for the children’s individual and/or family therapists and placed the CLR in the role of coordinating that care. Ms. Saltzman told the court the children needed therapy — yet, by her own later written communications, the therapy was not occurring.
Rules she had a duty to follow — and, in my view, chose not to: Colo. RPC 1.1 (competence) & 1.3 (diligence); C.R.S. § 14‑10‑116 (role of the CLR). A sustained failure to act on a client’s known need is neglect. People v. Ain, 35 P.3d 734 (Colo. 2001).
Basis: my own firsthand knowledge, the communications I received, and what I witnessed in court.
Is this what a Child’s Legal Representative who takes her role seriously does?
Ms. Saltzman represented to the court that insurance co-pays were a burden and that cost stood in the way of the children’s care. In fact the children were covered under the father’s private UnitedHealthcare (UHC) plan, which carried a $0 co-pay and $0 deductible for these services, and she had been given the benefits information. At a hearing she referred specifically to “father’s healthcare” — indicating she was aware that the mother had separately enrolled the children in the State children’s health plan (CHP+), which carries no cost at all. Yet she raised only the father’s plan with the court and never brought the mother’s CHP+ enrollment to the court’s attention, continuing to frame cost as a barrier that did not exist. An outside vendor confirmed the children’s CHP+ enrollment. My own attorney corrected her on this in open court, and the judge directed her to speak with him afterward — yet she treated that as not worth a conversation: there was no constructive follow-through from her, only one excuse after another to my attorney, as her own written communications to the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel document.
Rules she had a duty to follow — and, in my view, chose not to: Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(1) (candor to the tribunal) & 8.4(c) (dishonesty). Actual knowledge is not required — recklessness suffices. People v. Layton, 494 P.3d 693 (Colo. 2021). A statement is material if it could influence the court. In re Fisher, 202 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2009).
Basis: my own knowledge of the children’s UHC coverage and CHP+ enrollment, an outside vendor’s confirmation of the CHP+ enrollment, and what I witnessed in court.
Is a cost excuse — for care that cost nothing — what the children’s own attorney is supposed to tell the court?
Rather than act, Ms. Saltzman blamed the non‑custodial parent for the children not being in therapy — a narrative contradicted by the record and one she did not verify before repeating it to the court.
Rules she had a duty to follow — and, in my view, chose not to: Colo. RPC 1.3 (diligence) & 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). Discipline follows a misrepresentation of the state of a matter. People v. McCaffrey, 925 P.2d 269 (Colo. 1996).
Basis: the communications I received and my own records.
Is blaming a parent — instead of getting the children help — the job of a children’s representative?
A no‑cost, in‑network provider willing to see the children was identified and forwarded directly to Ms. Saltzman. Days earlier she had told the court that finding a provider was very difficult, and she claimed to have spent dozens of hours calling therapists without success. She is a Child’s Legal Representative — a court‑appointed role that should carry real weight with providers. No care followed.
Rules she had a duty to follow — and, in my view, chose not to: Colo. RPC 1.1 (competence) & 1.3 (diligence). A protective or “good” motive is no defense to a false or misleading statement. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002).
Basis: the provider information I forwarded to her, and what I witnessed in court.
If a court‑appointed children’s attorney truly could not place a single child after “dozens of hours,” what does that say — and if a ready provider was handed to her, why was it ignored?
Ms. Saltzman moved to bar a parent from the children’s school, medical, and other records — the very records that would have documented whether the children’s needs were being met. The motion devoted far more attention to attacking a volunteer child‑welfare advocate than to the children’s care.
Rules she had a duty to follow — and, in my view, chose not to: Colo. RPC 1.7 (personal‑interest conflict) & 8.4(d). A CLR remains fully bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct. People v. Gabriesheski, 205 P.3d 441 (Colo. App. 2008).
Basis: my own firsthand knowledge of the motion she filed affecting my access to the children’s records.
Whose interest is served by suppressing the records that show how the children are doing?
Ms. Saltzman filed a Colorado Secretary of State name reservation for the name of a volunteer advocate’s organization, and she contacted a parent’s office landlord — interfering with that parent’s business relationship. Neither act had anything to do with representing the children.
Rules she had a duty to follow — and, in my view, chose not to: Colo. RPC 4.4(a) (no substantial purpose other than to burden a third person) & 8.4(d). Even where immunity applies, it does not relieve an attorney of the rules governing the profession. Stepanek v. Delta County, 940 P.2d 364 (Colo. 1997).
Basis: the public Colorado Secretary of State record, and my own firsthand knowledge.
What does reserving a critic’s business name have to do with a child’s best interests?
Ms. Saltzman represented to the court that the children’s school absences were excused. They were not, and the basis she gave is not a form of excused absence the Colorado truancy statutes recognize. She had requested and received the attendance records.
Rules she had a duty to follow — and, in my view, chose not to: Colo. RPC 3.3(a)(1) (candor to the tribunal). Statutes: C.R.S. § 22‑33‑104 (compulsory attendance) & § 22‑33‑102(3.5) (habitual truant). A knowing false statement to a tribunal is grounds for discipline. People v. Varallo, 61 P.3d 38 (Colo. 2002).
Basis: my own firsthand knowledge, the attendance records I hold, and the records request she sent me.
Should a children’s attorney tell a court something the records in her own hands contradict?
Taken together — statements to the court contradicted by the record, blame‑shifting, ignoring available help, moving to suppress the children’s records, and conduct aimed at critics rather than at the children — these concerns describe a representative whose energy ran against the interests she was appointed to protect.
Is this what a real Child’s Legal Representative — one who cares about her role and her responsibilities — does?
The principles above are not my invention. Courts have said them plainly:
“In representing the child’s best interests, the [guardian ad litem] was also representing the child, and thus, under CJD 04‑06 and Colo. RPC 1.6,” was bound by the rules. — People v. Gabriesheski (Colo. App. 2008)
“Actual knowledge is not required … a mental state of at least recklessness … meaning the lawyer deliberately closed her eyes to facts the lawyer had a duty to see.” — People v. Layton (Colo. 2021) (on Rule 8.4(c))
“Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea.” — Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (U.S. Supreme Court, 1974)
“Debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide‑open.” — New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (U.S. Supreme Court, 1964)
The idea that people entrusted with power must answer for how they use it is as old as the Republic.
“It is essential to the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience.” — Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 15
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. … you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” — James Madison, Federalist No. 51
“The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated for different purposes.” — James Madison, Federalist No. 46
A rule without a consequence is not really a rule. When immunity removes the courtroom consequence, the “auxiliary precaution” that remains is sunlight.
This is not a one‑off problem. Investigative journalism has repeatedly found that court‑appointed guardians and children’s representatives operate with sweeping immunity and little discipline — and that reform often comes only after public reporting:
If accountability arrives only after the public learns what happened, then telling the story is the accountability.
Colorado’s attorney‑discipline process is confidential. Under C.R.C.P. 242.41, a disciplinary file becomes public only after a formal complaint is filed with the Presiding Disciplinary Judge; a matter dismissed at intake stays confidential unless the attorney waives. OARC has no duty to post requests for investigation — and does not. So unless someone speaks, the public never learns a complaint was made at all.
But that confidentiality runs one way. The Rules bar the Office and its staff from discussing complaints — the secrecy is theirs to keep. No rule bars me. I am the complaining witness, speaking about my own complaint and my own experience, and there is nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure — or anywhere else — that prohibits me from doing so. The confidentiality obligation belongs to the regulator, not to the citizen who brought the concern.
A blank public record does not mean a clean record. If you search this attorney and find no public discipline, that tells you only that no matter against her has ever reached the public stage — not that no one has ever complained. Because dismissed‑at‑intake matters stay sealed, there is no way for the public to know whether one person has raised a concern or many have. The secrecy runs in exactly the wrong direction: it shields the individual whose conduct was questioned, while the parents, children, and citizens the system exists to protect are left in the dark. In my opinion, that is backwards — the public, not the professional, is who confidentiality should be protecting.
The reason so little conduct ever produces public discipline is built into how complaints are screened. In its 2024 Annual Report, the Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel reported:
A screen that stops roughly nineteen of every twenty complaints before an investigation even begins is a powerful filter. But a filter measures what gets through it — not what was true. That a complaint was gated out at intake does not mean the underlying conduct did not happen. It means the matter was closed under the standard the intake office chose to apply.
And here is the part that does not add up: the Office keeps investigators on staff — five of them — whose job is to investigate attorney misconduct. Yet if roughly nineteen of every twenty complaints are closed at the front door, before any investigation begins, then what, exactly, are those investigators left to investigate — and how many meritorious complaints never reach them because the door was wrongly shut at intake?
And in my case, that standard was not the one the rules prescribe. The intake question the Colorado Supreme Court actually wrote is narrow and simple: whether the conduct, if proved, would constitute grounds for discipline (C.R.C.P. 242.13(b)(1)(A)). Instead, my complaint was measured against two hurdles that appear nowhere in those rules:
So the gate is not narrow because the conduct was minor. In my view it is narrow because the wrong test was used — a hearing‑level burden, plus a judicial‑finding prerequisite that the rules never established. A screen built out of standards the rulemaker did not write is not the screen the rules require.
The Office would answer, of course, that intake is a screen — that it may weigh whether a complaint warrants investigation, and that mentioning clear‑and‑convincing evidence was simply realism about where the matter would end up. But the rule the Supreme Court wrote does not ask that. It asks whether the allegation, if proved, would constitute grounds for discipline. The words “if proved” do the work: they assume the facts and pose a legal question — would this conduct violate the Rules? — not a predictive one about whether it could be proven to a hearing burden. Had the Court meant the intake screen to forecast the outcome of a hearing, it would have written “if provable by clear and convincing evidence.” It wrote “if proved.” The Office may test whether credible evidence supports an allegation; it may not import the trial’s burden into the doorway and call that screening.
There is a name for acting beyond the authority the law gives you: ultra vires — Latin for “beyond the powers.” Nothing in the Colorado Supreme Court’s rules authorized the two hurdles the Office used to close my complaint. And an invented standard no longer earns a reviewing court’s deference: in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (U.S. Supreme Court, 2024), the Court ended the doctrine that once told judges to defer to an agency’s reading of the law. Courts — not the office being questioned — now say what the rules mean.
And here is the part that is hard to square. The Office claimed no authority for how it dismissed — the clear‑and‑convincing burden and the judicial‑finding prerequisite appear nowhere in the rules. Yet it invoked authority to bar any review of that dismissal, citing the finality provision of C.R.C.P. 242.13(b)(3). No rule to justify the closure; a rule wielded to prevent anyone from checking it. In my opinion, an office that will not follow the rules when it acts, but insists on the rules when it is questioned, has the relationship exactly backwards.
I am not asking for money — I have never asked for a dollar. I am asking a public office to apply the standard its own rules set, the one the Colorado Supreme Court actually wrote, and to let its work be checked, as every accountable office’s work must be.
Is that fair — and is it what the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel is supposed to be doing? If nineteen of twenty complaints are turned away, how many are turned away at a gate the rules never built?
A gate that almost never opens does more than fail the person turned away. It teaches a lesson to everyone watching. When attorneys learn that the regulator will not ring the bell — that the odds of any real consequence are vanishingly small — the incentive to tell the truth weakens. The Rules of Professional Conduct command candor to the court. But a rule that is not enforced is only a suggestion, and some lawyers come to treat a false statement in a filing as a tactic rather than a violation, precisely because they have every reason to believe no one will call it.
The courtroom is supposed to be the other check. But when the court itself does not hold a lawyer to account — whether through overload, inattention, or a willingness to look the other way — that check falls too. The entire system rests on officers of the court telling the truth. When they do not, and the body built to enforce that duty steps back from it, the machinery of justice quietly breaks down — not with a scandal, but with a shrug.
And that leaves an honest person in an impossible position. When you hire an attorney who intends to play by the rules, and the other attorneys in the room are not, and the court does not step in, and the regulator that exists for exactly this purpose closes its door — what is one supposed to do? This page is one answer: say so, out loud, in public.
I am not characterizing what the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel said. Here it is, in its own words, alongside my response — so you can judge for yourself whether this was a real review.
How does a public-serving office stay closed for this long — while turning away the very emails it tells the public to use?
The dismissal — Jill Perry Fernandez, Senior Assistant Regulation Counsel (Colorado Attorney Reg. #18552) (June 30, 2026):
“In order to pursue discipline against an attorney, this office must be able to prove that the attorney violated one or more of the Rules by clear and convincing evidence. The available information does not establish by clear and convincing evidence a violation by Ms. Saltzman …”
“to prove an attorney made an unethical misrepresentation to the court, this office must be able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) the attorney made a false statement; 2) the attorney knew the statement was false at the time that it was made; and 3) the statement was material. What you have reported … fails to meet these standards. I note there is no evidence the court made findings that Ms. Saltzman made misrepresentations …”
“The intake division of this office does not accept email submissions. Please note that further submissions made via this email address will be deleted without being reviewed.”
“pursuant to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 242.13(b)(3), this decision is final and you are not entitled to further review or appeal.”
My response — to Regulation Counsel Jessica E. Yates (Colorado Attorney Reg. #38003):
“Clear and convincing evidence is the burden of proof at a disciplinary hearing … It is not the standard for a preliminary screen. Under C.R.C.P. 242.13(b)(1)(A), the only question at the screening stage is whether ‘an allegation has been made that, if proved, would constitute grounds for discipline.’”
“Had the Supreme Court intended to impose that burden at intake, Rule 242.13 would say so. Instead, the Rules place that burden exclusively at the adjudicatory stage … The Office was entitled to weigh whether credible evidence supported my allegations; it was not entitled to demand, at intake, the clear-and-convincing proof that Rule 242.31 assigns to the hearing.”
“No rule conditions the Office’s authority on a prior judicial finding … Attorney discipline is an independent process … Declining to investigate on that basis is not a neutral application of the Rules; it abandons the Office’s core function under C.R.C.P. 242 — the enforcement of the Rules against attorneys who violate them.”
The Office’s reply — April M. McMurrey, Deputy Regulation Counsel (Colorado Attorney Reg. #34194) (July 9, 2026):
“A review of this dismissal by the Legal Regulation Committee is not available under the Colorado Supreme Court rules. Pursuant to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 242.13(b)(3), a decision made at intake to dismiss a request for investigation is final and a complainant is not entitled to further review or appeal. This matter remains closed and dismissed.”
“I understand you have also requested accommodations under the ADA. As you have nothing currently pending with this office, there is presently nothing for us to accommodate.”
One more detail — from the letters themselves. The June 30 dismissal carried the typist reference “JPF/aj.” The July 9 reply — the letter refusing any review of that dismissal — carried the typist reference “AMM/jpf.” Those lower-case initials identify who prepared the letter: “jpf” is Jill Perry Fernandez, the very attorney whose June 30 decision I had asked the Office to review. In plain terms, the official whose decision was under challenge helped prepare the Office’s refusal to review her own decision.
So the answer to a documented, multi-count complaint was: the trial burden applied at the front door; a demand for a judicial finding the rules never require; email that would be “deleted without being reviewed”; and a door marked final, with no review, and — once closed — nothing left even to accommodate. In my view, that is the gate doing exactly what the earlier section describes.
Read the full documents (my name redacted; the Office’s names left intact):
This concern is not new, and it is not only mine. For more than forty years, legal scholars have questioned whether the legal profession’s self-policing serves the public or the profession itself. The most cited work is by the late Stanford law professor Deborah L. Rhode, a leading authority on legal ethics.
“almost one-half [of bar association officials] perceived some consumer skepticism concerning the bar’s capacity for self-regulation generally, or its ability to act disinterestedly …” — Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1981)
Three decades later, Rhode returned to the subject with Lucy Buford Ricca. Their empirical study found that the profession’s enforcement machinery is largely complaint-driven and protectionist — turning on the guild’s own interests far more than on any evidence that the public had actually been harmed. Deborah L. Rhode & Lucy Buford Ricca, Protecting the Profession or the Public? Rethinking Unauthorized-Practice Enforcement, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2587 (2014).
The same Office that closed my complaint also runs Colorado’s Unauthorized Practice of Law division — it is printed on the very letterhead of the letters above. The question Professor Rhode spent a career asking is the question this page asks: when a profession regulates itself behind closed doors, whose interests is it really protecting — the public’s, or its own?
The people who run this system are public servants. The Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel is a public body — funded by the public and empowered by the Colorado Supreme Court — and the attorneys who staff it, whose names and decisions appear above, draw public salaries to do a public job. With public power and public money comes a duty the courts and the Founders named centuries ago: accountability to the people.
“speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” — Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (U.S. Supreme Court)
“a democracy is effective only if the people have faith in those who govern …” — United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961) (U.S. Supreme Court)
“That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them.” — George Mason, Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), § 2 — the founding-era source later echoed, nearly word for word, in several state constitutions.
And this is not merely aspiration — Colorado has written it into its own law. The Colorado Revised Statutes declare that “the holding of public office or employment is a public trust, created by the confidence which the electorate reposes in the integrity of public officers … and employees,” and that an official “whose conduct departs from his fiduciary duty is liable to the people of the state as a trustee of property.” C.R.S. § 24‑18‑103.
And by a measure the voters themselves enacted, Colorado public officials “shall … avoid conduct that is in violation of their public trust or that creates a justifiable impression among members of the public that such trust is being violated.” Colo. Const. art. XXIX, § 1(1)(c) — a standard Colorado’s constitution sets for its public officials, whatever the precise reach of its enforcement machinery. Not merely violating the public trust — creating the impression that it is being violated. In my opinion, a public watchdog that turns away a documented complaint under a standard its own rules do not set is exactly the impression Colorado’s own law tells its officials to avoid.
And there is a further point. Applying a standard the rules do not contain is not an exercise of discretion — it is legal error. Discretion is the power to choose among lawful options; it is not license to invent a test the rulemaker never wrote. When an office measures a citizen’s documented complaint against a burden and a prerequisite that appear nowhere in the rules, that is not a protected judgment call — in my opinion, it is an abuse of the power and the position the public entrusted to it.
Public office is a public trust. If public officials take public money and choose to ignore the public good they were entrusted to protect, the question answers itself: public servants must be publicly accountable. When the body charged with holding lawyers to their duties will not examine a documented complaint under the standard its own rules prescribe, that is not a private grievance — it is a public one. A trust betrayed does not erase the duty; it is exactly what makes an accounting owed.
You do not have to trust me, and you do not have to be a lawyer. Copy this page — or just the rule citations and the Office’s own quoted words above — and paste it into any AI model. Ask it a simple question: “Under Colorado’s attorney-discipline rules, was the correct standard applied when this complaint was screened out at intake?”
Try it on any of them: ChatGPT · Claude · Google Gemini · Microsoft Copilot · Perplexity · Grok · Meta AI.
Ask, and judge the answer for yourself — most will walk through the same analysis this page gives: the intake screen asks only whether the conduct, if proved, would be a rule violation (C.R.C.P. 242.13(b)(1)(A)) — and the clear-and-convincing burden the Office applied belongs to a hearing before the Presiding Disciplinary Judge (C.R.C.P. 242.31(b)(3)), not to the front door. The analysis here is on point.
And if you find an error — if any part of this is wrong — please say so. Use the form below to drop a comment. I would rather be corrected than be mistaken. But I do not believe you will find one.
This page is my opinion and my truthful firsthand account of a matter of public concern — the conduct of a licensed attorney serving as a court‑appointed official. I have a First Amendment right to state my views, and there is no gag order.
These are not minor or fringe rulings. Every decision below is from the United States Supreme Court — the highest court in the country — except Keohane, which is from the Colorado Supreme Court, the highest court in this state. When these courts speak, every other court must follow.
These join New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. above — also U.S. Supreme Court decisions — together forming the core body of First Amendment law protecting truthful accounts and opinion on matters of public concern.
Nothing on this page is taken from any sealed court file. It is my own account and my own opinion, which I am free to share.
This page is not against Child’s Legal Representatives or Guardians ad Litem. Most of them do difficult, thankless work well — they meet the children, read the record, tell the court the truth, and put the child’s real interests first, even when it makes no one happy. The role exists because children need an independent voice, and a good CLR or GAL is exactly that voice.
That is the whole point. Accountability is not the enemy of good representatives — it is what protects them, by keeping the standard high and distinguishing the many who honor the role from the few who don’t. Holding one representative to the Rules takes nothing away from the ones who follow them every day.
If a CLR or GAL did right by your family, say so here. Recognizing good work is as much a part of accountability as flagging bad work — and it shows what the standard should look like. Use the form below and choose “A CLR or GAL who did the job well.”
You are not alone. This is an open space for people to share, in their own words, their own firsthand experiences with the family‑court and attorney‑discipline system in Colorado and elsewhere. You are welcome to share:
These roles go by different names in different states. If a court appointed a lawyer or evaluator to speak to or about your child, this includes you — whatever the title. Common names include: Guardian ad Litem (GAL), Child’s Legal Representative (CLR), Child and Family Investigator (CFI), attorney for the child, best‑interests attorney, minor’s counsel (California), amicus attorney (Texas), law guardian (New York), child representative (Illinois), Parental Responsibilities Evaluator or custody evaluator, parenting coordinator, and CASA volunteers.
Every post reflects the views and firsthand knowledge of the person who submits it. This page simply hosts them.
Accounts submitted by others, shown after review. Each reflects the views and firsthand knowledge of the person who submitted it — this page simply hosts them. Use the filters to narrow by state or by subject.
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Members of the public have posted reviews of this attorney and her firm. You can read them, unedited and in the reviewers’ own words, at the source:
Who is Bonnie E. Saltzman? A Colorado family‑law attorney (Reg. #18973), Law Offices of Bonnie E. Saltzman, LLC, Greenwood Village, Colorado, who served as a court‑appointed Child’s Legal Representative.
Does quasi‑judicial immunity excuse a CLR from the rules? No. It may block a damages lawsuit, but it does not lift her duty to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct, and it does not license reckless conduct.
Does OARC publish requests for investigation? No — under C.R.C.P. 242.41 the process is confidential until a formal complaint is filed; a matter dismissed at intake stays secret.
Are these proven findings? No — and they have not been properly adjudicated. They are my allegations and opinion, which I also submitted to OARC. No disciplinary findings have been entered because OARC closed my complaint at intake under the wrong standard rather than investigating it — the absence of findings reflects that refusal to look, not a ruling that the conduct did not occur.
Is this legal to publish? Yes — it is opinion and a truthful firsthand account on a matter of public concern, and nothing here comes from any sealed court file.